Chainstack, which runs blockchain nodes for other companies, published an incident report on 3 November 2026 and added to it on 11 November. The report says an attacker reached a development environment on 26 October and parts of production on 29 October. Chainstack detected the intrusion on 31 October, cut those paths the same day, and says it closed the investigation on 2 November. Customer-facing services stayed up. The nodes customers use, the console, and the API were not modified. This page will not describe the route past the front door.
The front door, in the company’s own sentence, was a test dashboard left reachable on the internet with the administrator login still set to the default, and without a second check such as single sign-on. A default login on a tool that was only meant for a test is still a login. It is not a software flaw the company says it found. Chainstack says it found no evidence that a vulnerability in the software was what let the attacker in.
What happened
What may have been read from a customer database is organisation names, the names of account holders, the email addresses of people on those accounts, and password hashes. A hash is not the password. It is a stand-in that can still be attacked offline if the password was weak or reused. The attacker also reached systems that hold the credentials for customers’ nodes. Chainstack says it has no evidence those credentials were read, and it is treating them as exposed anyway. It does not store full card numbers or card security codes, so those were not in the file. No loss of customer funds is in the report.
The report asks every customer to change the account password, including anywhere the same password was reused, to rotate node credentials, and to regenerate platform API keys if they use that API. It says the current node addresses keep working until that rotation is done. A rotation the customer has not finished is a credential that still works. Chainstack says it will not ask for a password, a token, or a key. A message that does is not the report. See How do you keep crypto safe?.
Why it matters
If you pay Chainstack to run a node, the coins on the chains that node talks to were not what this report says was taken. What may have left is the record of who you are, and the keys that let software talk to the node. A node credential is not a seed phrase, and it is not nothing: it is a key to a service that can see and submit what that node is allowed to do. If your coins sit in a wallet this company cannot sign for, this page did not spend them. See How crypto wallets actually work.
This is the same shape as Chainalysis saying password hashes were exposed, at a different company. A hash in a database is not a login that already succeeded. It is a reason to change the password before someone else finishes the guessing.
What happens next
Whether any customer finds that a node credential was actually used, which Chainstack says it has no evidence of. The password changes and the key rotations, which are the customers’ to finish. Watch Chainstack’s own report. We will not treat a hash as the password, and we will not treat “no evidence it was read” as a reason to leave a node credential in place.
Not a recommendation to open or close a Chainstack account. Not a finding that customer funds moved. Not a description of the route. The report’s own account is a default login, a list of what a customer record can contain, and a service that stayed up.






